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Globalization, Federalism, and Foreign Direct Investment 
Federalism is a relatively familiar and well-researched concept that has recently 
enjoyed a new wave of interest from political scientists. The reason for such a revival lies 
primarily in the fact that this is a strategy that is being utilized by an increasing number 
of developing nations in their quest for rapid economic self-development and growth 
(e.g., see Bird 1993; Rodden 2004). In particular, many less developed countries (LDCs) 
implement federalism and decentralization in order to gain credibility in the political 
arena and achieve greater efficiency in terms of economic performance. Diffusion of 
power and authority from the national to state and local governments is widely associated 
with an ability to radically improve the quality of governance (Fan et al. 2008; Rondinelli 
1989, 59-60; White 2011).  
As a policy direction, the move towards decentralization among developing 
countries began to take strong roots during the 1980s, encouraged by successful 
experiences of the developed world (Oxelhein 1993, 11). With the potential to satisfy 
both the right’s call for greater efficiency and the left’s appeal for a more even 
distribution of power, pressures for decentralization arose both internally and externally. 
Multinational corporations, freer trade, and internationalization of business all had forced 
central governments to reconsider the role they play in the economy and society. As a 
result, “subnational governments are now doing a larger share of the work of government 
in both developed and the developing countries” (Schneider 34). As this policy choice 
was becoming increasingly popular, it captured the attention of political scientists. A 
plethora of new research agendas and programs arose that explored the impact of 
federalism and decentralization on a variety of socially relevant phenomena, such as the 
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quality of governance (Weingast 1995), corruption (Treisman 2000), economic growth 
and development, and the size of the government (Jin and Zou 2002; Stein 1999), quickly 
came to dominate this research area.  
One particular incentive for decentralization is the desire to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by multinational corporations (MNCs). By the means of increasing the 
number of “veto points” within governments, federalism is purported with reducing 
uncertainty involved in future government policy, thereby lowering the risk of 
governments’ reneging on the original terms of contracts with the multinationals, which 
reduces their risks of losing overseas profits and production. The hypothesized 
relationship in this research project, therefore, is that the presence of federalism should 
make a nation a more favorable target of foreign investment in the eyes of a 
multinational. Subsequently, one is led to expect that nations with higher degrees of 
federalism should, ceteris paribus, experience higher volumes of FDI. The goal of this 
paper is, therefore, twofold. First, I will test separately these types of federalism in order 
to determine whether any of them exert a significant effect on the flow of FDI into a 
country. Second, based on the findings, I will attempt to propose new areas of research 
that explore these individually, as well as in interaction with one another.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, I will briefly discuss the 
growing importance of foreign direct investment from the perspectives of both 
multinational corporations and host governments. Second, I will overview the normative 
and positive theories of federalism, point out common flaws of previous research, and 
finally, postulate about the possible connection between federalism and foreign direct 
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investment. Thirdly, I will outline the policy stability argument, and fourthly, I will 
empirically test the hypotheses outlined using available data. The final section concludes.  
Foreign Direct Investment and Multinational Corporations 
With ever increasing levels of globalization in recent decades (das Neves 2012, 
15), nations have become more and more integrated if one considers the amount of cash 
and other forms of capital that are being transferred across national borders (Casi and 
Resmini 2012, 95). While the benefits of globalization abound, one negative consequence 
is that it adds another dimension to states’ competition for power and money- their ability 
to attract foreign direct investment (Chan and Clark 1995, 166). The substantial literature 
on globalization almost uniformly agrees that virtually every state today is engaged in 
policy manipulation designed to make their country more attractive in the eyes of 
multinationals. Before proceeding to causes and implications of foreign direct 
investment, it is necessary what exactly we mean by that term. 
As laid out by Scott X. Liu (1997), FDI occurs “when a firm acquires[s] 
ownership control of a business unit in a foreign country.” According to the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), an FDI is an “investment 
made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of the 
investor.” OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (2008, 49) defines 
a foreign direct investor as “an entity (an institutional unit) resident in one economy that 
has acquired, either directly or indirectly, at least 10% of the voting power of a 
corporation (enterprise), or equivalent for an unincorporated enterprise, resident in 
another country.”  
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Such ownership takes shape in one or more of the three basic forms: 
1. Establishing a new subsidiary or branch (“greenfield investment”); 
2. Acquiring control share of an existing firm usually through a merger and 
acquisition; or finally, 
3. Participating in a joint venture (Liu 1997) 
Most importantly, however, foreign direct investment involves a transfer of 
capital from one country to another.  
Race for the FDI 
Occurring simultaneously with countries’ move towards greater decentralization, 
the “global race” for FDI took off during the eighties, reaching astonishing %185 billion 
in 1989 (Oxelheim 1993, 11). According to a recent OECD report (2002, 6-7), the 
amount of FDI flow in the world had increased fourfold from 1995, reaching the figure of 
$1.3 trillion (US) in 2000. So, what is the fuzz all about? 
The main set of reasons why nations desire to attract foreign investment stems 
from the positive externalities that are believed to be brought about by the inflow of out-
of-country capital and resources, such as innovative technologies and previously 
unattainable skills (Blomstrom and Kokko 2003; Capello and Dentinho 2012, 96; Dutt 
1998, 45; Javorcik 2004; Jensen et al. 2012, 4; OECD 2002, 5; Villaverde and Maza 
2012; Wang 2010; Zhang et al. 2010). For example, Javorcik (2004, 625) finds in the 
case of Lithuania that foreign direct investment was significantly associated with the 
“spillover” effect on domestic firms and industries. He concludes his research by stating 
that leakage of foreign know-how occurs through both backward (agreements between 
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domestic suppliers and foreign firms) and forward (“interactions between foreign 
suppliers of intermediate inputs and their domestic customers”) linkages. In a similar 
study, Wang (2010) finds that spillovers occur via inter-industry linkages in his case 
study of Canada. 
Zhang et al. (2010) find that the specific mechanisms through which FDI 
increases productivity of domestic firms include not only the introduction of new 
technology, but also more efficient and effective managerial practices. His sample of 
Chinese manufacturing firms examined over the period of 1998-2003 also reveals that the 
absorption of foreign know-how also depends on the domestic firms’ capacity to learn; 
furthermore, maximum learning occurs in those cases in which the technological gap 
between foreign and domestic firms is intermediate. Casi and Resmini (2003), however, 
argue that the benefits from FDI are far from “automatic” and that whether the host 
nation’s productivity and output in fact does increase depends on its domestic firms’ 
willingness to adopt the new practices.  
Unequal Spread of the FDI 
Before we can discuss which factors affect positive learning that comes with FDI, 
it is first necessary to note that not all countries are equally successful in the volume of 
foreign investment that they are able to draw to themselves. Indeed, as observed by 
several scholars, foreign direct investment tends to flow to the already well-developed 
countries, as well as several of the most promising developing countries. As a result of 
such dynamic, the spread of FDI is extremely uneven across the globe.  
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Understandably, multinational corporations seem to avoid investing in those areas 
which are “being marginalized, precisely for [the] conditions that keep these areas 
underdeveloped because of the inability to attract both FDI and domestic capital” (de 
Soysa 2003, 118, brackets added). This occurs primarily due to structural governance 
characteristics of the potential host countries, such as the low levels of institutional 
development and a lack of well-developed human capital. The resulting “vicious cycle of 
low levels of investment and net outflows of capital from much of the poor world” keeps 
those countries permanently stuck in bad economic performance. The countries of sub-
Saharan Africa represent perhaps the best example of such dynamics (Collier and 
Gunning 1999). Another curious tendency noted by scholars is the change in FDI patterns 
over time (Capello and Dentinho 2012, 4). Compared to previous several decades, in 
recent year the search for increased productivity and profits has led multinational to 
outsource on a task-by-task basis, rather than that of complete functions. These decisions 
are primarily based on the availability of information, merit of human capital, and some 
other factors.  
Strategic Behavior of Multinationals 
While there are plenty of criticisms of the homo economicus, which is the 
omniscient and perfectly calculating model of human behavior which the economics 
profession uses for building its theories, it is conventional to accept the proposition that 
corporations (in general) act in accordance with the principles of rational choice and 
instrumental rationality. Even though the limitations of data availability, cognitive 
processing, and moral hazard persist in the cases of business organizations, multinational 
corporations do nevertheless possess considerable capacity necessary for making 
7 
 
informed business decisions. This suggests that multinationals can be safely expected to 
act rationally and strategically in their decisions “where and how much” to invest outside 
their own country.  
It is also conventional to assume that profit-maximizing is the main objective 
driving corporate behavior. While there are firm-endogenous reasons why firms export 
their production (e.g., due to internal characteristics – see Bernard and Jensen 2004), 
potential host countries around the world are nevertheless in an active campaign to attract 
FDI. Comparative and international political economy scholarship has identified several 
important political factors that drive the decision of where to invest. Particularly, 
comparative scholars have identified the “quality of governance” to be one of the most 
important political factors determining the flow of FDI into a country.  
Predictably, one of the most crucial factors has to do with the policies of 
(potential) host governments. Those countries which work actively to increase their 
attractiveness to multinationals tend to attract more foreign capital. This conjecture has 
been confirmed by empirical research. For example, Hardin and Javorcik (2011) found 
that investment promotion strategies represent fairly inexpensive but effective tools used 
by developing countries wishing to attract FDI. However, they also find that this strategy 
does not significantly help industrialized nations attract investment. Perhaps, the 
explanation lies in the fact that the business and economic environment in such countries 
is already favorable, so no effort is required on the part of the government.  
One of the most comprehensive studies has been conducted by Steven Globerman 
and Daniel Shapiro (2002). Using a large-N study, they utilized six governance 
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infrastructure variables for a sample of countries for the period between 1995-1997. The 
six governance indicators are intended to capture the various dimensions of an effective 
government, reflecting de Soysa’s (2003, 119) and others’ (e.g., Przeworski and Limongi 
1993) “hunch” that it is “politics” rather than the regime type that is the determinant of 
socially desirable outcomes, such as economic growth or inflow of foreign direct 
investment. While relatively broadly, these six indicators are meant to capture state 
characteristics such as the stability of the political system, “rule of law, graft, regulatory 
burden, voice and political freedom, and government effectiveness” (Globerman and 
Shapiro 2002, 1902). They found those factors to be highly statistically significant in 
their models. 
Federalism and the Quality of Governance 
Logic and Purpose behind Federalism 
One of the most persistent challenges in the business of constructing a 
government is striking the necessary balance between giving the government enough 
power in order for it to be able to preserve the market and ensure that “everybody plays 
fair” on the one hand, while keeping it from becoming excessively powerful as to turn it 
into a “predatory” “Leviathan” whose power causes it to act to the detriment of the very 
goals for which it was created (Oates 1985; also see Buchanan 1980 for the original 
argument). Several tools have been utilized in order to achieve such a balance, including 
the rule of law and checks and balances. Federalism is another way of achieving this 
goal. By “vertically” separating governmental power into several autonomous layers, the 
principle is to construct mechanisms of policymaking by diffusing it to as local level as 
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possible thereby ensuring both effectiveness and maximum representation (de Soysa 
2003, 120). 
 As has been mentioned in the introduction, due to its postulated effects of 
increasing accountability, effectiveness, and representativeness of government, 
federalism has been widely experimented with by second and third world countries 
starting in the decade of the 1980s as the optimal governance mechanism. One of the 
difficulties in studying federalism from scholarly perspective stems from the fact that it 
has been conflated and confused with other terms that are often associated with it, such as 
democracy and quality of governance. Indeed, earlier, pre-Riker (1964) scholarship (and 
in some cases even scholarship published after his seminal work) writings, exploring the 
dynamics of federal systems and their comparison with non-federal systems was 
frequently criticized for its inability to separate normative and positive considerations. In 
the next section, I will explore the arguments made in favor of federalism as related to 
ostensible improvements in the quality of governance. As discussion in the previous 
sections has hoped to convince the reader, multinational corporations pay a great deal of 
attention to the behavior of host country government as an indicator of their credibility 
and take those factors into account when making their business calculations. 
Mechanisms of Federalism: Veto Points Argument 
The foremost argument made in favor of federalism has to do with increased 
policy stability which it is purported to provide. The veto points argument, originally 
made by George Tsebelis (1995), helps explain why federal systems are characterized by 
higher policy permanency. The gist of the argument is that the higher is the number of 
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players in a political system that is required in order to change the status quo, the more 
stable are the policies produced by such governments. In his analysis, Tsebelis compared 
different institutions and partisan setups and found that Westminster-dominant and 
single-party systems, in which there is only one veto player, experience much higher 
policy volatility than presidential and coalitional governments. This occurs due to 
incongruity of opinions of political leaders. In single party systems, because its leaders 
exercise legislative power virtually unilaterally, there is greater policy volatility. In 
comparison, in presidential systems, such as that of the United States, in which the 
agreement of both the president and Congress is required, status quo is much more stable, 
especially in times of divided government. As will be shown in later sections, this is the 
baseline argument of this paper. 
Mechanisms of Federalism: Economic Theory 
The second main argument deals with the economic theory of federalism. As 
summarized by Qian and Weingast (1997), the first argument was originally made by 
Friedrich Hayek (1945) who asserted that better spending decisions can be made on as 
local a level as possible due to the fact that the government located closer to the people 
possesses better information concerning the needs to those people than a more central 
(and distant) government would. As succinctly summarized by White (2011), the logic is 
that “if a government can perform closer to the people it is meant to serve, the people will 
get more out of government and, in turn, will be more willing to accept that government’s 
authority.”  
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 The second argument, advanced by Tiebout (1956) in favor of federalism, is that 
the resultant competition between subnational units allows citizens to better satisfy their 
preferences in such a system by appealing to that level which is better able to “do its job.” 
Yet another, somewhat less accentuated alleged benefit of federalism and 
decentralization lies in the greater stipulated innovation in such systems. According to 
this proposition, for the reason that local governments are in control of smaller pool of 
resources, they can be used as “laboratories” for policy experimentation since failures are 
more likely to be localized and hence smaller in terms of damage (Bretton 2000, 2). 
Several studies have been conducted aimed at assessing the impact of federalism 
on several macroeconomic variables which should be relevant for multinational 
corporations when evaluating a country as a potential recipient of its capital investment. 
Albert Breton (2000) found in the cases of the US and Canada that judiciaries in both 
countries kept each layer of the vertical chain of the government from invading property 
rights of citizens.  
Defining and Operationalizing Federalism 
Perhaps, the most substantial flaw that has plagued federalism research has to do 
with difficulty and a lack of precision in conceptualizing and operationalizing federalism 
(Schneider 2003). In fact, the extreme difficulty in conceptualizing federalism has led 
political economist Michael Burgess (2006) to view federalism as a “microcosm of the 
problem with studying political science itself.” As a result of such murkiness and 
imprecision, scholarship has failed so far to state decisively whether federalism indeed 
has the postulated effects on the quality of governance which its normative supporters 
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claim for it, and has led scholars to contradictory results (Rodden 2004, 3; Blume and 
Voigt 2008). As Jonathan Rodden points out, lack of refined measures of federalism is 
the primary reason for insignificant and sometimes contradictory findings of federalism 
research found in the first generation of empirical research. Thee contribution of this 
project is that it seeks to use both relatively simple, dichotomous measures, as well as 
more informative continuous measures of federalism in order to assess the impact of 
decentralization on the flow of foreign direct investment into a country.  
Varieties of Federalism 
Based on a comprehensive review of the available literature, he proposes a 
tripartite definition of federalism by breaking it down into three types: fiscal, 
administrative, and political. The goal of this paper is to empirically assess the validity of 
the claim that federalism significantly impact the flow of FDI into a country by 
examining these different types of federalism. Next, I will discuss in more detail the 
distinction between the three types of federalism. I will then turn the reader’s attention to 
the breakdown of the extent of federalism, using typology identified by Byrd (1993).  
Fiscal federalism refers to the traditional economic conceptualization of 
federalism by capturing the notion of the relative levels of revenues and expenditure 
between the central and subnational government(s). While there are several way to 
empirically capture this notion, the most widely accepted method is by measuring the 
portion of subnational revenues/expenditures of the total revenues/expenditures, often 
expressed as a percentage. The larger is the portion of the overall taxation that is 
attributed to the subnational unit(s), the greater is the degree of federalism. 
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Administrative federalism, according to the World Bank, “seeks to redistribute 
authority, responsibility, and financial resources for providing public service among 
different levels of government.” It primarily deals with the provision of public goods, and 
is thus concerned with the civil service. In short, administrative decentralization defines 
the ways in which “political institutions turn policy decisions into allocative outcomes” 
(White 2011, 2). The World Bank, in agreement with others, divides administrative 
federalism into three degrees: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. These 
represent different degree of decentralization, with deconcentration being the weakest, 
and devolution the most extensive, forms of decentralization. 
While these are “distinct,” it is important to keep in mind that they are merely 
ideal types, and are best thought of as arbitrarily chosen “points” along a continuous 
distribution. The distinctions are that in deconcentration the central government 
maintains tight control over the subnational units; power in this case is not “transferred” 
but is merely deconcentrated geographically. With delegation, the central government 
maintains considerable control over the subnational unit; however, that unit has some 
capability for independent decision making. With devolution, however, the central 
government almost entirely abdicates its powers to the subnational governments 
(Martinez-Velasquez and Timofeev 2010, 3). The only control it has over the state level 
decision makers is significantly altering the structure of the relationship itself; hence, this 
type of arrangement is most reminiscent of a control type of relationship between the 
central and the state governments.  
The third main type of decentralization is political federalism. The main goal of 
political decentralization is to improve citizens’ ability to influence public decision 
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making by giving them more say in the formation and implementation of public policies. 
Often accompanied by pluralistic politics, it is rooted in the idea that localization of 
decision making and elections of public officials is associated with more prudent and 
democratic decisions by improving politicians’ knowledge of their constituency’s needs 
and priorities and citizens’ ability to convey such information to those officials and better 
monitoring and enforcement. 
One thing that is clear is that these three concepts of decentralization are closely 
related and interrelated. For example, Rodden (2004) records simultaneous increase in all 
three types of federalism in his world sample for the period from 1970 to 1990. For 
example, an increase in the share of revenue collected from central to subnational 
governments indicates a shift towards decentralization. However, such move tells nothing 
of the autonomy of subnational units. This concept is captured by the administrative 
and/or political federalism. 
In spite of these differences, we observe a fairly high degree of correlation 
between the different kinds of federalism. One obvious reason for this correlation is the 
source of decentralization. Federalism despite its murkiness of definition and 
conceptualization, is widely associated with the normatively positive notions of improved 
and responsible, as well as responsive, governance, and giving more power to the people. 
It is no wonder then that one naturally expects nations which are decentralized in one 
dimension to be also decentralized, at least to some degree, in other dimension(s). 
While these three types of federalism are closely related, Schneider (2003), by the 
means of confirmatory factor analysis of data from 1996 for sixty-eight countries, finds 
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that they are also noticeably different. An interesting question that arises with this finding 
is “what implications do these different types of federalism have on the inflow of the FDI 
into a country, as well as whether an interaction of these factors exerts an independent 
effect on the flow of FDI into a country. 
In the next section, I will discuss in greater detail the three types of federalism, 
the current and past research that has investigated the role of each on important 
macroeconomic and political phenomena, as well as my theory of the possible 
implications of each of these types of federalism on the inflow of foreign direct 
investment. 
Measurements of Federalism 
As hinted at before, it is a common pitfall in political science that while acts of 
government, as well as their subsequent effects and consequences on the society are 
relatively easy to measure and operationalize, operationalizing the structure of the 
government itself sometimes poses quite unexpected difficulties (Marks et al. 2008, 111). 
Federalism and decentralization are not exceptional in this regard.  
While most of the literature surveyed agreed on the definition of types and 
dimensions of federalism, some challenge the apparently ubiquitous confusion of 
federalism and decentralization. For example, Blume and Lorez (2008) points out that the 
crucial distinction lies in the constitutional design. Federalist countries, such as the 
United States and Canada, constitutionally grant their respective states and provinces 
substantial autonomy over several major policy areas. On the other hand many countries 
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which have been decentralizing cannot be considered federal because decentralization is 
not firmly ingrained in the political structure. 
While Blume and Lorenz provide a valid criticism, it is important to keep in mind 
that if one is to follow their advice, the number of countries considered federal for any 
type of quantitative analysis would have been dramatically curtailed. Furthermore, 
considering the research question and theory presented ahead, following the rule of 
constitutional design would be unjustified in terms of the sacrifice on variation in the data 
it would pose and, as the theory section will prove, such distinction bears little 
consequence on the theory at hand.   
Theory 
The argument made in this paper is largely based on and adds another extension 
to the Tsebelis’ argument concerning veto points. In its simplest form, it states that the 
number of veto points should be directly related to the stability of polity. The higher is 
the number of veto points, the less volatile policy stability tends to be. The logic behind 
this argument is fairly straightforward. Policy is much more volatile (i.e., likely to shift) 
if an agreement of only one decision maker is required, whereas it is much more likely to 
remain consistent if simultaneous agreement of several decision makers is required in 
order to change the status quo. As Quan Li summarizes it, “the dispersion of power the 
constrained executive, the large number of veto players over public policy, and the 
independent judiciary, collectively serve to strengthen the rule of law” (2006, 64). 
Federalism, then, is just another mechanism that increases the number of veto points.  
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Policy stability, in turn, is positively and directly related to greater investment by 
foreign corporations. Underlying this argument is the implicit assumption that 
corporations care about policy stability. And such assumption does not seem divorced 
from reality. Because corporations’ major incentive is to increase profits, they are 
reasonably expected to, and conform very well to the behavior of strategically making 
both short and long-term choices in a future that is always uncertain. It becomes clear 
then that they should strongly prefer policy stability as it alleviates the risks of 
governments’ reneging on their pledge or even downright expropriating a multinational’s 
assets, thereby increasing expected benefits. Additionally, prescience of future economic 
conditions increases their ability to forecast future payoffs. Corporations, therefore, 
desire greater policy stability and greater number of veto points.  
The positive (from the perspective of a multinational) benefit of federalism is that 
it provides greater policy stability because it increases the number of veto points. Fiscal 
federalism provides perhaps the best case in which we are likely to observe the postulated 
causal mechanism at work. The overall tax a corporation pays that is levied by several 
decision-makers is more likely to stay closer to the original (overall) level of taxation, 
because in unitary systems initiation and agreement of only one (the) decision-maker is 
required in order to shift policy. Compare that to fiscally federal systems in which in 
order for policy to shift, each decision maker will have to shift policy in the same 
direction by the same amount (e.g., equal percentage increase in corporate tax 
implemented by both state and federal governments).  
Even more importantly, this scenario is very unlikely to occur if one considers the 
driving factors behind taxation policy, and the differences in those motivations across 
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vertical layers of government. While federal government is concerned with the “big 
picture” of national foreign and domestic spending, state and local governments have 
completely different considerations in mind. Because they are driven by different factors, 
it seems extremely unlikely that shift in taxation policy between national, state, and local 
governments, will occur in the same direction simultaneously in the same direction. 
Hence, the “overall” (from the perspective of a multinational) taxation rate is much less 
likely to shift in fiscally federal systems than it is in unitary systems. 
An important point that must be made in regards to this argument which makes it 
applicable towards a variety of situations is that it is largely irrelevant what kind of policy 
the host government pursues towards corporations wishing to invest in its economy. 
Whether the tax policy is favorable (tax exemptions compared to domestic firms) or 
unfavorable (higher rates of taxation for foreign firms), the fact that decision are made on 
two (or more) levels of government will, in federal systems, introduce lower levels of 
risks.  
This mechanism can be easily extended to other forms of federalism. For 
example, the distinguishing feature of political federalism is that state and local officials 
are directly elected by the people instead of being appointed by bureaucrats and elected 
officials at a federal level. Because they do not “owe” their job to the national 
government, such state and local officials are more likely to exercise independent 
thinking and decision making than mere figureheads in politically unitary systems. 
Because provincial and local decision-makers exercise dominion over important policy 
areas which are consequential to multinationals (e.g., local environmental planning, 
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zoning laws, other local regulations, etc.), political and administrative federalism are 
likely to be very important in corporations’ decisions whether to invest in a country.  
This theory can be expressed in one main research hypothesis, and three sub-
hypotheses.  
H1: Based on the veto points argument, federalism should be positively and 
 directly associated with higher levels of foreign direct investment by multinational 
 corporations.  
H1a: Fiscal federalism is positively related to the inflow of foreign direct 
 investment into a country: the more fiscally federal a nation is, the higher flows of 
 FDI it should  experience. 
H1b: Political federalism is positively related to the inflow of foreign direct 
 investment into a country: the more politically federal a nation is, the higher 
 flows of FDI it should experience.  
H1c: Administrative federalism is positively related to the inflow of foreign direct 
 investment into a country: the more fiscally federal a nation is, the high flow of 
 FDI it  should experience. 
H2: There is an interactive effect between different types of federalism. Ceteris 
 paribus, nations which are both fiscally and politically federal, should experience 
 higher inflows of foreign direct investment than unitary systems.  
 
Volatility of Policy and Economic Growth 
An analogous argument has been made in regards to economic development by 
Nooruddin (2011, 40), who argues that it is the volatility of change in the economic 
growth (i.e., how quickly and rapidly the rate of economic growth rates vary across time), 
rather than the “average” rate of growth per se, that matters most for economic 
development and modernization. Using case studies of several developing countries, he 
shows that those countries which experienced less rapid and dramatic “swings” in the 
rates of economic growth across time, tended to achieve higher levels of development.  
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The role of the government in this argument is twofold: first, it is to convince 
domestic audiences to save money in order to spend more in the future; and second, to 
convince foreign investors that their country is safe for investment (Nooruddin 2011, 22). 
In order to accomplish both goals, government needs to be able to make credible 
commitments. In order for commitments to be viewed as credible, constraining 
mechanisms on actions of policy makers are necessary. 
In order to motivate his argument, Noorddin uses the “veto players” argument that 
is the cornerstone of this paper’s theory. The crux of his argument is fairly simple. 
Because economic development necessarily requires long-term planning and investment, 
political system needs to provide for a favorable economic and political environment 
which maintains long-term stability. Hence, policy which is believed by investors to 
remain stable across relatively long periods of time is more likely to incentivize them to 
pour their money into the economy. This is why the number of veto players is so crucial 
for economic development. Because larger number of veto players increases policy 
stability, it is postulated to increase economic output and development.  
Essentially, the same argument is being made here. Because an increase in the 
number of veto players makes it more difficult for challengers to alter the status quo, 
greater policy stability is achieved, which increases the probability of the policy 
survivability and continuation into the future. Because the owners of capital can be more 
confident that the current policy is likely to prevail in the future, they are able to forecast 
and plan future payoffs from current investment, all of which causes them to invest in 
that particular country or environment. Hence, the higher is the number of veto players, 
the higher should be the level of investment into a country. 
21 
 
Counterargument? 
As is true with the vast majority of social science arguments and theories, one of 
the potential problems regarding this argument is that the opposite argument can be 
made. Particularly, one could argue that federalism could exert a significant negative 
effect on the inflow of FDI for the reasons of risk. The logic of such argument primarily 
deals with bureaucratic burden and lag, and has been articulately illustrated by Kessing et 
al (2007, 10) with a hypothetical example of a foreign investor wishing to finance a 
project in Germany: 
“Investor who made the decision to build a plant in, say, Munich, has to 
 deal with several governments: with the city government of Munich, with 
 the district government in the district in which Munich is located, with the 
 government of the state of Bavaria in which  Munich is located, and with 
 the federal government of Germany, as Munich also belongs to Germany.”  
As this example makes obvious, federalism can serve to greatly exacerbate the 
problems of risk because in such systems presence of multiple decision makers can 
indeed lead to more rather than less risk. Additionally, it may be argued that the 
bureaucratic holdup problem is also exacerbated in federal systems.  
While the author of this project believes that the main argument of this paper is 
more valid than the counterargument, the potential benefit of carrying out an empirical 
study like this is that it will allow us to find the answer to this question with actual, real 
world data.  
Part III: Empirical Investigation 
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Preliminary Evidence 
In order to provide some preliminary evidence to support the argument outlined in 
the previous section, below I provide some summary statistics, as well as graphic plots of 
the inflows of FDI over the 40 year period into two countries which are roughly similar 
on many relevant political and economic characteristics, but which differ in terms of their 
position on federalism – India and China. While India is a highly developed federalist 
system, China is a very centralized one. Hence, an investigation of these two countries’ 
inflows of FDI should provide some preliminary evidence establishing whether foreign 
investment and a nation’s level of federalism are related in any meaningful way. 
The table below provides a rough comparison of means and standard deviations of 
inflow of foreign investment between federal and centralized systems. These statistics 
were compiled based on the data used in the statistical analyses conducted in the 
empirical section below.  
Table 1: Simple Summary Statistics 
Type of system Average Inflow 
of Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Federalist 3.41e + 09
1
 1.72e + 10 -2.83e + 10 3.40e + 11 
Centralized 1.96e + 09 4.87e + 09 -4.53e + 08 3.58e + 10 
 
As we can see from this table, federalist nations tend to, on average, experience 
much higher inflows of foreign direct investment than more centralized systems. The 
comparison of standard errors for the two groups of countries shows that the mean inflow 
                                                          
1
 A note on scientific notation: 3.41e + 09 is equivalent to 3.41*10
9
, i.e., $3,410,000,000 
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of FDI into a federal country is likely to be statistically and substantively higher than the 
inflow of FDI into a centralized system. These simple statistics show as a fairly 
convincing preliminary evidence in support of the theory.  
In order to make these observed patterns more concrete and specific, I will next 
turn to an examination of the graphs 
depicting the inflow of foreign direct 
investment into two countries that can 
serve as foremost examples of 
federalist and centralized systems 
respectively – India and China. 
The reason why India and 
China provide good cases for such an 
investigation has to do with similarities between the two nations in terms of relevant 
politico-economic characteristics. Both countries represent lower-middle nations in terms 
of their levels of economic and political 
development, expressed in such criteria 
as the standard of living and wealth.  
Furthermore, both nations 
feature important characteristics that 
exert both a positive and a negative 
effect on the inflow of foreign direct 
investment. While China has been actively conducting a campaign of market 
Figure 1: FDI into China 
Figure 2: FDI into India 
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liberalization designed to modernize its system (Chen 1995), it remains a Communist 
nation, thereby causing natural suspicion among Western investors. India, on the other 
hand, while featuring a highly stable political system, its economic progress is hindered 
by persisting poverty and the presence of the so-called “marginal population.” Also 
importantly, both nations share borders and are located in the same region, which allows 
us to rule out region-based explanations for the difference in the inflow of FDI between 
the two countries. Importantly, however, the two nations are different when it comes to 
their level of federalism. While India is a very well-developed federalist system, the 
Communist Party of China, unwilling to share its governmental power with provincial 
officials outside Beijing (and the party), have maintained a highly centralized form of 
governance in their country. As we can see from the axes labels, during the period 
examined, India has tended to attract higher inflows of foreign direct investment than has 
China.  
While the presented evidence makes a fair case for the postulated positive 
influence of federalism on the inflow of foreign direct investment into a country, 
significance of this relationship cannot be reliably asserted with just preliminary data. In 
order to do that, I now turn to statistical tests of the empirical models postulated by the 
theory.  
Specifying the Model 
In order to empirically investigate whether the differences in the mean inflows of 
foreign direct investment between federal and centralized systems are, in fact, statistically 
different, several statistical analyses were conducted using different measures and 
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conceptualizations of federalism. In the most general form, the models run can be 
expressed as: 
Logged FDIit = β0 + β1Federalism + β2Democracy + β3Logged Trade + β4OECD + 
β5Year + εit 
in which logged FDI is the natural log of the annual inflow of foreign investment in 
country I in year t; Federalism is the variable for the particular dimension of federalism 
whose impact is being assessed; Democracy is the level of democracy; Logged Trade is 
the annual merchandized trade as a percentage of GDP; OECD is a dummy indicating 
whether a particular country was a member of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development; and Year is simply the year for each particular 
observation used in order to time-detrend the data. Below I discuss the data sources, as 
well as additional motivation for using this specific data in more detail.  
Variables Definition and Conceptualization 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable is the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into a 
country. It is a continuous variable and is 
measured in current US dollars. The data 
is obtained from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI). This data 
is available for virtually every country in 
Figure 3: Tsline 
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the world; primarily for the period between 1971 and 2012. Because this data directly 
measures the variable of interest, this is the only dependent variable that is used in this 
research. Because it is a continuous variable, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is 
appropriate.  
As the histogram bellows demonstrates, there are two potential problems with this 
variable. First, as the tsline plot depicting the bivariate relationship between FDI and time 
demonstrates, the data most likely suffer from non-stationarity. 
In order to solve this problem, given the nature of non-stationarity, a time trend variable 
is appropriate. In this case, since the year variable is already present in the data, it will be 
used in the regressions to account for the time trend. 
As the histogram of the dependent variable shows, however, another potential 
source of problem is the fact that the data is not normally distributed. While this problem 
does not seem particularly severe, a graph of logged FDI demonstrates a considerably 
better fit to the assumption of normality. Hence, a logged FDI variable is most 
appropriate for the analyses to be conducted.  
Figure 4: Distribution of the Dependent Variable: Level (Left) and Log (Right) 
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Independent Variables 
Administrative Federalism 
As Rodden (2004, 486) points out in his revisionist article “Comparative 
Federalism and Decentralization,” the issue of administrative federalism has been largely 
overlooked by scholars due to the difficulty of its measurement. Thankfully, this 
empirical gap has been alleviate by Brown economist J. Vernon Henderson. In order to 
measure administrative federalism, Henderson asks whether countries possess certain key 
characteristics that are distinguishing administratively fiscal and unitary systems. 
In order to assess the presence of administrative federalism, Henderson asks 
several key questions, such as whether the national government has an authority to 
override the decisions made by lower (i.e., provincial and local) level bureaucrats. As is 
obvious from the discussion above, subnational “autonomy” makes little sense if the 
federal bureaucrats and decision makers may simply override their decisions which they 
simply do not like. The second main question which Henderson asks is which level of 
government is responsible for what he determines to be three key policy areas: primary 
education, infrastructure, and local policing. Using different weight systems, Henderson 
combines the constituent variables into 6- and 9-dimension measures of 
policy/administrative federalism. Because I expect a positive relationship between 
administrative federalism and foreign direct investment, I expect a positive beta 
coefficient on that variable.  
Fiscal Federalism 
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Several data sources are available for the variables of interest. In order to ensure 
robustness of my findings (especially if they prove to be significant), I will utilize 
different measures of federalism. The two databases that have been used for this project 
are the Comparative Political Dataset III, provided by the University of Bern, and the 
Government Finance Statistics, provided by the International Monetary Fund. Below, I 
will briefly discuss each of these sources.  
Comparative Political Dataset III provides data on fiscal decentralization, fiscdec, 
which measures “the tax revenue of state and local government as percentage of total 
taxation.” This data is available for the 21-year period from 1990 to 2011 for 
approximately 35 OECD and non-OECD countries.  
Several considerations were driving the data collection and sample selection. 
Perhaps, the most important is the sample size. Because this research is interested in a 
comprehensive examination of the impact of federalism on the flow of foreign direct 
investment, the goal was to collect as much data as possible for as wide a variety of 
countries as the data permitted. Because of these reasons, while full analyses were 
conducted with this data, I also utilized a more comprehensive analysis by including the 
original data on fiscal federalism and decentralization taken from the International 
Monetary Fund.  
The main independent variables that are used in order to assess the impact of 
fiscal federalism on the inflow of foreign direct investment is the subnational 
taxation/revenue expressed as a percentage of the total taxation/revenue. Below is the 
formula used to obtain these data. 
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Fiscal decentralization = 
                        ⁄                           
                         
 
The higher the value, the higher is the degree of fiscal federalism. Because I 
expect the relationship between fiscal federalism and FDI to be positive, I expect the beta 
coefficient for fiscal federalism to be positive. The benefit of using a continuous instead 
of alternative ordinal variables (Blochiger & Rabesona 2009) is that it allows one to more 
accurately capture the degrees of variation between different regimes which otherwise 
could have been classified in the same category if ordinal measures were used. 
Political Federalism 
Database of Political Institutions, published by the World Bank under the 
authorship of Phillip E. Keefer, and freely available for download, provides a 
dichotomous measure of political and administrative (as well as fiscal) federalism. While 
this measure is crude, it provides a fair operationalization of these two types of 
federalism. The variable author is a dummy for whether states and provinces have an 
authority over taxing, spending, and legislating. Words “taxes” and “spending” seem to 
refer more to fiscal decentralization, a state’s ability to legislate points at least to some 
degree to political federalism.  
Comparative Political Dataset I contains three measures of federalism. The first 
variable, fed, is trichotomous measure (“no,” “weak,” and “strong”), and is based on 
Huber et al. 2004. This variable is available for roughly the period from 1960 to 2011 for 
all of the countries, with the exceptions of Greece, Portugal, and Spain, for which the 
data is not available during earlier periods. Another variable for federalism, lfed, is only 
available for one (usually first) year for each country. Hence, it allows us to conduct a 
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cross-national analysis only, without the temporal dimension. The third variable, lsec, is 
derived from Lijphart’s second dimension of federalism.  
Database of Political Institutions (2012) of the Development Research Group 
under the World Bank provides several variables which measure both fiscal and political 
federalism. The first variable, federal, is a dummy variable which records whether a 
nation is federal (1) or unitary (0).  
The next two variables, state and muni, measure political federalism more 
directly. The second variable, state, is a trichotomous variable which indicates the 
presence and the scope of state elections. A value of “0” indicates no state elections; a 
value of “1” indicates that the executive(s) is appointed while legislature is elected; a 
value of “3” indicates that both the executive(s) and the legislature are elected at a 
state/provincial level.  
The third variable, muni, is also a trichotomous variable which indicates presence 
and the scope of local elections. A value of “0” indicates that neither local executive(s), 
nor its legislature is elected locally. A value of “1” indicates that the local executive(s) is 
appointed while its legislature is elected; a value of “3” indicates that both the 
executive(s) and the legislature are elected at a state/provincial level. Because I am 
interested in using both of these variables, I will conduct regressions using both additive 
and multiplicative terms.  
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Control Variables 
I use a battery of standard control variables that are ubiquitous in the literature on 
foreign direct investment: level of democracy, rule of law, the level of trade, and OECD 
dummy (Jensen 2003; Jensen 2008; Li and Resnik 2003; Strasavage 2002).  
One of the most important control variables is the level of democracy. Taken from 
Policy IV compiled by Marshall and Jaggers (2002). The variable Democracy is on an 
additive eleven-point scale which is based on the adherence to the principles of political 
inclusiveness, electoral competitiveness, and constraints on executive action. While the 
role of regime type has for some time been a hotly debated issue, the work of Nathan 
Jensen has convincingly empirically demonstrate time and again that when all things are 
taken into consideration, regime type IS an important determinant of the inflow of foreign 
direct investment into a country.  
 As has been repeatedly asserted in the literature review section, multinational 
corporations tend to care a lot about the quality of governance in a country. The reason 
for that is simple: a government which does not govern well and systematically violates 
fundamental principles of “fair rule” creates doubts and suspicions in the multinational 
decision-makers concerning safety of their investment in that country. In order to account 
for this factors, I utilizes Kauffman rule of law (2012) as one of the control variables. As 
defined by the World Justice Project (2012, 8), this index gives countries ratings based on 
their degree of adherence to four “universal” principles (of justice): accountability, 
securities of persons and property, just and efficient law making and law-enforcement. 
Another quality of governance control variable used in these analyses is central bank 
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independence. Presence of an independent central bank adds another significant veto 
player to the “game,” as one of central banks’ primary feature is to control inflation and 
unemployment through its management of the monetary supply (i.e., the amount of 
money in the circulation in the economy) (Cukierman and Webb 1995).  
Finally, some scholars have found that there are regional effects associated with 
the inflow of FDI. One of the primary reasons for such dynamics deals with the fact that 
countries located in the same region tend to display similar macroeconomic and political 
characteristics, such as comparable levels of development and size of the economy. 
Because inclusion of many regional dummies would unnecessarily eat up precious 
degrees of freedom without a corresponding increase the explanatory power of the model, 
I utilize a dummy variable for whether a country was a member of OECD for each 
particular year
2
. Membership in this organization serves to significantly boost up the 
rating of a country in terms of its business climate and the development of the economy, 
and is necessary to take into consideration. It is important to notice that it was coded on 
the basis of not only the country, but also the year. I coded a country as having a value of 
“1” on the OECD dummy only in the cases in which it was actually a member of that 
organization. For example, while Czech Republic is coded as “1,” indicating that it is a 
member of the OECD for the year 1995, its value for the year 1994 is equal to “0.” 
 
                                                          
2
 The dataset provided, however, does feature a batter of regional dummies with sub-Saharan 
Africa as the base region. As replacing OECD dummy with regional controls demonstrates, 
however, only the North America dummy is statistically significant. As we can further speculate, 
this is probably caused by the United States and Canada, both of which are highly developed 
economies and the governments of which are considered highly reliable for multinational 
investors.  
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Additional Model Specification Issues 
As performing standard checks to ensure data normality has revealed, the data 
suffers from serial correlation. Serial correlation is a problem in which the errors are 
correlated across time, which poses potential problems for the analysis. The concern that 
this poses is that Ordinary Least Squares estimation assumes that the each “event” 
(observation) is independent from one another, which is obviously not true in any time-
series analysis in which the same data generating units are observed across time. Because 
we run the risk of overlooking such dependence between observations, OLS is likely to 
overestimate the significance of the independent variables, overlooking temporal 
dependence in the data. This results in artificially small standard errors and hence 
artificially large significance (Keele and Kelly 2005).  
In order to correct for the violation of the assumption of no serial correlation, I 
utilize a standard correction for serial correlation by including a lagged dependent 
variable. While some (e.g., Achen 2000) view lagged dependent variable as a serious 
methodological pitfall due to its proclivity to dominate the regression and wipe out 
significance on any other regressors on the right-hand side, it is the most viable 
alternative in this case.  
Results 
In reporting the results of the analyses that were run for this project I will report 
the most interesting (read “significant”) results first, starting with administrative 
federalism (Table 1), next assessing the effect of fiscal federalism, and lastly, analyzing 
of the effects of political federalism. The table 1 below reports the results assessing the 
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impact of administrative federalism on the inflow of foreign direct investment. Model 1 
assesses statistical and practical significance of the 6-dimension federalism variable, 
while model 2 assesses significance of the 9-dimension federalism variable.  
Table 2. The Impact of Administrative Federalism on the Inflow of Foreign Direct 
Investment 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model I Model II 
   
Lag FDI 7.17*** 9.68*** 
 (1.92) (2.89) 
Federalism, 6-dimension 0.5495** 
(0.2271) 
 
Federalism, 9-dimension  
 
0.7454** 
(0.2704) 
Logged Trade 0.5512  0.5417 
 (0.3772) (0.3706) 
Central Bank Independence -0.2998 -0.4652 
 (2.5287) (2.3188) 
Democracy 0.0434 -0.0031 
 (0.0512) (0.0543) 
OECD 0.8824* 1.2820** 
 (0.5286) (0.6009) 
Year 0.0788** 0.0742** 
 (0.0247) (0.0242) 
Constant -139.8286** -130.9598*** 
 (48.3939) (47.5732) 
Number of Observations 63 65 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As we can see, both the 6-dimensional and 9-dimensional operationalizations of 
administrative federalism are statistically significant at the most commonly accepted 
standard of statistical significance of 0.05 level. Also, the beta coefficients are in the 
expected positive direction. These results indicates that an increase of one on the 
federalism variables lead to 0.55 or 0.55 unit increase in foreign direct investment for 6- 
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and 9-dimension federalism, respectively. These results are robust to control for the level 
of trade, democracy, central bank independence, time variable, as well as an indicator 
variable for whether a country is a member state of the OECD
3
.  
An important thing to notice about these results is that while these models do not 
feature as large a battery of controls as is typical of this research agenda, it does include a 
lagged dependent variable, which allows us to control for the most significant factors by 
including previous amount of the inflow of FDI in the right-hand side. Because the same 
factors which were influencing the inflow of FDI into a country in year t-1 are also at 
work in determining the level of foreign investment in year t, the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable allows us to indirectly model these factors in a regression.  
Table 2 reports results from the analyses run which utilized the IMF’s GFS data. 
Model 1 reports the assessed impact of fiscal federalism, conceptualized as the 
subnational taxation expressed as a percent of the overall taxation rate. Model 2 reports 
the impact of fiscal federalism, conceptualized as the subnational spending as a 
percentage of the overall spending. Model 3 reports an interactive model of fiscal 
federalism.   
Table 3. The Impact of Fiscal Federalism on the Inflow of Foreign Direct 
Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model I Model II Model 3 
    
Lag FDI 2.84 2.99 3.16 
 (2.35) (2.32) (2.14) 
Subnational Revenue -0.0171 
(0.01955) 
 0.0785 
(0.0505) 
                                                          
3
 Kauffman rule of law variable was not included in these regressions due to data unavailability. 
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Subnational Expenditures  
 
-0.0232 
(0.0234) 
0.034 
(0.0379) 
Rev*Spend   -0.0026** 
(0.0013) 
Logged Trade -1.3543*  -1.484* -1.4707** 
 (0.72) (0.8339) (0.699) 
Kauffman Rule of Law 0.0279 
(0.1681) 
0.0905 
(0.1633) 
0.3738* 
(0.2106) 
Democracy -0.0815** -0.0933** -0.1556*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0407) (0.0504) 
Central Bank Independence 0.6863 0.2285 1.5218 
 (1.491) (1.043) (1.5383) 
Year 0.142* 0.1601* 0.2121* 
 (0.0788) (0.0848) (0.0798) 
OECD 1.4724** 1.5759** 1.4403** 
 (0.6925) (0.7547) (0.6263) 
Constant -256.3904 -291.9607* -397.1185* 
 (156.0273) (36.8731) (157.9701) 
Number of Observations 43 43 43 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
As we can see from the Table 2, neither of the fiscal federalism variables is 
significant in either of the regressions. Interestingly, however, they are also both in the 
opposite direction of what is expected according to the theory. The results in the tables 
would lead one to conclude that an increase in sub-national units’ ability to tax and spend 
independently of the central government lead to lower levels of foreign investment. 
However, it is also important to notice that the beta coefficients are substantively and 
statistically insignificant. Another oddity of these results is that according to these 
analyses, trade exerts a significant negative relationship! This is contrary to both previous 
results and the literature. Additionally, Democracy variable is now significant and is also 
negative.  
Because of these deviations in findings from previous results and literature, I also 
ran an interactive model of fiscal federalism. Theoretically, it is plausible to suppose that 
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federalism can exert an influence on the inflow of FDI only if the subnational 
government(s) have the ability to both tax and spend independently. The results of the 
regression purport that there is, in fact, an interactive effect. The t-statistic on the 
interaction variable is equal to -2.22
4
, with the corresponding p-value of 0.027, which is 
significant at a 0.05 level. Oddly enough, however, both trade and democracy variables 
are highly statistically significant in the opposite direction from what is expected.  
As Brambor et al. (2006) point out, however, in order to demonstrate significance 
of an interaction variable, it is best to provide a marginal effects graph. Hence, below is 
the marginal effects plot that provides graphical results of Model 3’s interaction term.  
 
Figure 5: Marginal  Effect of Fiscal Federalism 
                                                          
4
 The figures in the table itself lead to a t-statistics that is equal to exactly two. The 
difference in this result and the value provided by the statistical software is due to the 
rounding error.  
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Next, Table 3 reports the findings of the impact of political federalism on the 
inflow of FDI. Because the data available contains separate measures for the presence of 
local and provincial elections, the analyses were run utilizing both additive and 
multiplicative combinations of the two. Model 1 reports the estimated relationship 
between federalism and FDI by separately estimating the significance of the two 
variables, while Model 2 reports the estimated relationship between federalism and FDI 
utilizing an additive measure of political federalism; whereas Model 3 reports the 
estimated relationship between a multiplicative measure of political federalism.  
Table 4: The Impact of Political Federalism on the Inflow of Foreign Direct 
Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III 
    
Lag FDI 4.26* 4.60** 4.30* 
 (2.40) (2.53) (2.43) 
Municipal Elections -0.5661 
(0.4072) 
 -1.2277** 
(0.4969) 
State Elections  0.4525 
(0.2366) 
 -0.8708 
(1.1859) 
Additive  -0.0254 
(0.2128) 
 
Multiplicative   0.7048 
(0.6582) 
Logged Trade 1.0763**  1.0356** 1.0525** 
 (0.3603) (0.3463) (0.3573) 
Kauffman Rule of Law 0.1533 
(0.2611) 
0.2215 
(0.2478) 
0.1114 
(0.2472) 
Democracy 0.0662 0.0396 0.0626 
 (0.0552) (0.038) (0.0538) 
Central Bank Independence -1.0464 -1.2276 -1.2237 
 (1.5507) (1.4741) (1.4728) 
OECD 0.0692** 0.6919* 0.9563** 
 (0.3995) (0.3773) (0.4089) 
Year 0.0692*** 0.0689*** 0.069*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0187) 
Constant -120.7131*** -120.0645*** -118.9716*** 
 (36.8181) (37.3865) (37.5698) 
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Number of Observations 241 241 241 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
As we can see, the results are rather disappointing. In all three models run, none 
of the political federalism variables – state and local elections separately, added together, 
or multiplied by each other- are significant in any of the models. In fact, the only other 
variable that achieves statistical significance is the logged trade variable. From technical 
standpoint, these results are easy to understand. As mentioned in the discussion of 
variables used in the analyses, the measures for political federalism were very crude and 
hence unable to effectively capture the concept they were meant to measure. The problem 
for further research, however, is that the data might simply not exist (yet). The Database 
of Political Institutions’ state and muni variables are the only two measures known to the 
author of this project that come close to accomplishing the set objective however crude.  
To recap the findings, while I find that given a fairly restrictive sample, 
administrative federalism exerts a highly significant positive effect on the inflow of 
foreign direct investment, the results for fiscal federalism are much more mixed with only 
an interactive measure of fiscal federalism achieving weak statistical significance. On the 
other hand, political federalism variable is insignificant in all tests
5
.  
Race to the Bottom and Fiscal Federalism 
One of the reasons why fiscal federalism turned out insignificant in the analyses 
conducted above may have dealt with the so-called “race to the bottom” thesis. As was 
noted in the introductory sections of this paper, nations around the world are actively 
                                                          
5
 Initially, the analyses were run without the control variable for the central bank independence. 
Those tables can be found in appendix III of this paper.  
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engaged in the competition for foreign direct investment. Due to the ludicrous benefits 
often subscribed to FDI, governments seek to employ various policy schemes designed to 
attract multinationals to invest in their country. One of the most popular policies is 
lowering (foreign and/or domestic) corporate taxation rates (Blochliger & Campos 2011, 
5). 
By lowering taxation rates, a nation seeks to make itself a more favorable 
investment target. The logic is quite simple: the lower the taxation rates, the more likely 
is a corporation to invest in that country. This occurs due to the fact that lower taxation 
rates decrease the costs of operating in a country, thereby increasing a corporation’s 
profits. Corporations, obviously operating on the principle of maximizing their profits, 
then, naturally seek to investment in countries that have lower interest rates.  
Hence, it is possible that the reason why fiscal federalism variable did not turn out 
significant was due to the “polluting effect” of decreased taxation rates. It is possible that 
while some nations were decentralizing, other nations were improving their attractiveness 
by decreasing the taxation rates. Because the effective rates of taxation are not explicitly 
controlled for in the models conducted, there is no way of knowing whether this is 
actually what is going on here. The problem with this argument, however, is the fact that 
such move towards decreasing taxation rates is ubiquitous across almost all nations, so it 
is unlike to “pollute” the results of these regressions. 
I now turn to the concluding remarks concerning the results of the empirical 
analyses carried out above, as well as their scholarly and policy implications. I will 
conclude by pointing out avenues for future research.   
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Concluding Remarks 
The results reported in this project are rather surprising and revealing. The fact 
that administrative federalism is so highly significant, while fiscal federalism, which, 
given the amount of enthusiasm among both scholars and policymakers, does not seem to 
exert a robust positive statistical significance, indicates that strategies that are believed by 
development scholars as the fundamental pillars of successful economic growth and 
development should be questioned. It also suggests that the uniform movement towards 
decentralization as a cure of all ills of poor governance has been overemphasized and that 
policymakers need to be more discerning when implementing such drastic changes in the 
operation of government.  
On the other hand, these results can easily and logically be explained. While 
subnational governments may possess the ability to collect tax and spend the generated 
revenue indicates a substantial ability of subnational government to maintain autonomous 
existence, without substantial policy autonomy, such “independence” is essentially 
useless. Indeed, these findings may lead one to conclude that fiscal federalism is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for attracting higher inflows of foreign direct 
investment. Perhaps, it is only the combination of fiscal and policy autonomy that are 
significant in convincing multinational corporations that a country is safe to invest in.  
The validity of the analyses carried out in this project and their findings are 
additionally strengthened by the fact that the hypothesized relationships were assessed for 
a lengthy period of time. For example, Henderson’s data which assesses the impact of 
administrative federalism, was only available for the years 1965 (not used here), 1975, 
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and 1985. Furthermore, the fact that the sample sizes in each of the regressions was 
relatively small serves as an additional confirmation that regressions reports a meaningful 
significance on the main variables that exists in the real world, rather than being 
statistical artifacts created by large sample size.  
 This research agenda may have a broad and interesting future depending on the 
data availability. Because positive scholarship on federalism is relatively young, the 
difficulty in conducting research in this area lies in the fact that effectively 
operationalized measures of its different types and dimensions are lacking. Hence, the 
first steps to take in the right direction is for scholars to turn their attention on figuring 
out the most valid ways of recording measures of federalism. Fortunately, as the literature 
review in this paper has demonstrated, scholars have already begun laying down the path. 
Unfortunately, however, this work remains the domain of individual scholars rather than 
an effort by comparative and international politics scholars as a community in building 
new datasets which would provide extensive knowledge and measures of federalism. 
Once data is available, it would be interesting to see studies assessing the impact 
of federalism on a wide variety of social and political phenomena. Hopefully, new and 
improved data will significantly help alleviate the problem of insignificant and 
contradictory findings and will allow political science to accumulate knowledge in this 
area of research.   
 
 
 
43 
 
Bibliography 
Achen, Christopher H. 2000. “Why Lagged Dependent Variable Can Suppress the 
 Explanatory Power of Other Independent Variables.” Presented at the Annual 
 Meeting of the Political Methodology, Los Angeles.  
Arzaghi, Mohammad, and J. Vernon Henderson. 2005. “Why Countries Are Fiscally 
 Decentralizing?” Journal of Public Economics 89(7): 1157-1189.  
Bahl, Roy. 1999. “Fiscal Decentralization as Development Policy.” Public Budgeting and 
 Finance 19(2): 59-75.  
Bernard, Andrew B., and J. Bradford Jensen. 2004. “Why Some Firms Export.” The 
 Review of Economics and Statistics 86(2): 561-569. 
Bird, Richard M. 1993. “Threading the Fiscal Labyrinth: Some Issues in Fiscal 
 Decentralization.” National Tax Journal 46(2): 207-27.  
Blochliger, H., and J. Pinero Campos. 2011. “Tax Competition Between Sub-Central 
 Governments.” OECD Working Paper No. 13.  
Blomstrom, Magnus, and Ari Kokko. 2003. “The Economics of Foreign Direct 
 Investment Incentives.” NBER Working Paper No. 9489.  
Blume, Lorenz, and Stefan Voigt. 2008. “Federalism and Decentralization: A Critical 
 Survey of Frequently Used Indicators.” Working Paper Joint Discussion Paper 
 Series in Economics (University of Marburg).  
44 
 
Breton, Albert. 2000. “Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the 
 Superiority of  Federalism.” Publius 30(2): 1-16.  
Buchanan, James, and Brennan Geoffrey. 1980. The Power to Tax: Analytical 
 Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University 
 Press.  
Capello, Roberta, and Tomaz Ponce Dentinho, Eds. 2012. Globalization Trends and 
 Regional Development: Dynamics of FDI and Human Capital Flows. 
 Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.  
Casi, Laura, and Laura Remini. 2012. “Globalization, Foreign Direct Investment and 
 Growth in European Regions: an Empirical Assessment.” In Globalization Trends 
 and Regional Development: Dynamics of FDI and Human Capital Flows, eds. 
 Roberta Capello and Tomaz Ponce Dentinho.  
Chan, Steve, ed. 1995. Foreign Direct Investment in a Changing Global Political 
 Economy. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
Chen, Chung. 1995. “The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in China’s post-1978 
 Economic Development.” World Development 23(4): 671 – 703.  
Collier, Paul, and Jan W. Gunning. 1999. “Explaining African Economic Performance.” 
 Journal of Economic Literature 13(3): 3-22.  
Cukierman, Alex, and Steven B. Webb. 1995. “Political Influence on Central Bank: 
 International Evidence.” The World Bank Economic Review 9(3): 397 – 423. 
45 
 
Dutt, Amitava Krishna. 1998. “Globalization, Foreign Direct Investment and Southern 
 Growth: Evidence from Selected Asian Countries.” In Economic Effects of 
 Globalization, ed. John-ren Chen. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 45-
 96.  
Fan, C. Simon, Chen Lin, and Daniel Treisman. 2008. “Political Decentralization and 
 Corruption: Evidence from Around the World.” Journal of Public Economics 
 (93): 14-34.  
Globerman, Steven, and Daniel Shapiro. 2002. “Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows: 
 the Role of Governance Infrastructure.” World Development 30(11): 1899-1919.  
Harding, Torfinn, and Beata S. Javorcik. 2011. “Roll Out the Red Carpet and They Will 
 Come:  Investment Promotion and FDI Inflows.” The Economic Journal 121(557): 
 1445-1476. 
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic 
 Review 4(35): 519-530.  
International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics. ICPSR08624-v2. Ann 
 Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 
 [distributor] 2010-07-26. doi:10.3886/ICPSR08624.v2 
Javorcik, Beata S. 2004. “Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of 
 Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages.” The 
 American Economic Review 94(3): 605-627. 
46 
 
Jensen, Nathan. 2003.”Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: The 
 Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment.” International Organization 57 
 (3): 587-616.  
Jensen, Nathan. 2008. Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct 
 Investment. Journal of Politics 70(4): 1040-1052.  
Jensen, Nathan, Glen Biglaiser, Quan Li, Edmund Malesky, Pablo Pinto, Santiago Pinto, 
 and Joseph Staats. 2012. Politics and Foreign Direct Investment (Michigan 
 Studies in International Political Economy). Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
 Michigan Press.  
Jin, Jing, and Heng-fu Zou. 2002. “How Does Fiscal Decentralization Affect Aggregate, 
 National, and Subnational Government Size?” Journal of Urban Economics 52: 
 270-293.  
Keele, Luke, and Nathan J. Kelly. 2005. “Dynamic Models for Dynamic Theories: the Ins 
 and Outs of Lagged Dependent Variables.” Political Analysis 14(2): 186-205.  
Kessing, Sebastian G., Kai A. Konrad, and Christos Kotsogiannis. 2007. “Foreign Direct 
 Investment and the Dark Side of Decentralization.” Economic Policy 22(49): 5-
 70.  
Klaus Armingeon, Romana Careja, Laura Knöpfel, David Weisstanner, Sarah Engler, 
 Pana-jotis Potolidis, Marlène Gerber. 2013. Comparative Political Data Set III 
 1990-2011. Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Berne. 
47 
 
Li, Quan. 2006. “Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: 
 A Cross-National Analysis.” Journal of Politics 68: 62-74.  
Li, Quan, and Adam Resnik. 2003. “Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and 
 Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries.” International 
 Organization 57(1):  175-211.  
Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, and Arjan H. Schakel. 2008. “Measuring Regional 
 Authority.” Regional and Federal Studies 18(2,3): 111-121.  
Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2002). Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics 
 and transitions, 1800-2002. 
Martinez-Velasquez, Jorge, and Andrey Timofeev. 2010. “Decentralization Measures 
 Revisited.” International Studies Program. Working Paper09-13. 
das Neves, Joao Cesar. 2012. “Globalization and Geographical Growth Patterns.” In 
 Globalization Trends and Regional Development: Dynamics of FDI and Human 
 Capital Flows. eds. Roberta Capello and Tomaz P. Dentinho. 
Nooruddin, Irfan. 2011. Coalition Politics and Economic Development: Credibility and 
 the Strength of Weak Governments. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  
Oates, Wallace E. 1985. “Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study.” The American 
 Economic Review 75(4): 748-57.  
OECD, 2002. Foreign Direct Investment in Development: Maximizing Benefits, 
 Minimizing  Costs. Paris, OECD.  
48 
 
OECD. 2008. OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment. Paris, OECD.  
Oxelhelm, Lars, ed. 1993. The Global Race for Foreign Direct Investment: Prospects for 
 the Future. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.  
Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1993. “Political Regimes and Economic 
 Growth.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7(3): 51-69.  
Qian, Yingyi, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. “Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving 
 Market Incentives.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4): 83-92. 
Ricker, William H. 1964. Federalism: Origins, Operation Significance. Boston, MA: 
 Little,  Brown.  
Rodden, Jonathan. 2004. “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning 
 and Measurement.” Comparative Politics 36(4):  
Rondinelli, Dennis A., James S. McCullough, and Ronald W. Johnson. 1989. “Analysing 
 Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries: a Political-Economy 
 Framework.” Development and Change (20): 57-87.   
Schneider, Aaron. 2003. “Decentralization: Conceptualization and Measurement.” 
 Studies in Comparative International Development 38(3): 32-56.  
De Soysa, Indra. 2003. Foreign Direct Investment, Democracy, and Development: 
 Assessing  Contours, Correlates, and Concomitants of Globalization. New 
 York, NY: Routledge.  
49 
 
Stein, Ernesto. 1999. “Fiscal Federalism and Government Size in Latin America.” 
 Journal of Applied Economics 2(2): 357-391.  
Strasavage, David. 2002. “Private Investment and Political Institutions.” Economics and 
 Politics 14(1): 41-63.  
Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. 
 "New  Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political 
 Institutions." 15:1, 165-176 (September), World Bank Economic Review. 
Tiebout, Charles M. 1956. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Political 
 Economy 64(5): 416-424.  
Treisman, Daniel. 1999. “Political Decentralization and Economic Reform: A Game-
 Theoretic Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 43(2): 488-517.  
Treisman, Daniel. 2000. “The Causes of Corruption: a Cross-National Study.” Journal of 
 Public Economics 76(3): 399-457.  
Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in 
 Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British 
 Journal of Political  Science 25(3): 289-325.  
Villaverde, Jose, and Adolfo Maza. 2012. “Inward Foreign Direct Investment in the 
 European Union. Regional Distribution and Determinants.”  
Wang, Yanling. 2010. “FDI and Productivity Growth: the Role of Inter-Industry 
 Linkages.” The Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’Economique 
 43(4): 1243-1272. 
50 
 
Weingast, Barry R. 1995. “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
 Preserving Federalism and Economic Development.” Journal of Law, Economics, 
 and Organization 11(1): 1-31.  
White, Stacey. 2011. “Government Decentralization in the 21st Century.” Center for 
 Strategic and International Studies 
 http://csis.org/files/publication/120329_White_Decentralization_Web.pdf.  
Wooldridge, Jeffry M. 2006. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Mason, 
 OH: South-Western.  
World Bank. 2014. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC. 
 (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators) 
Zhang, Yan, Haiyang Li, Yu Li, and Li-An Zhou. 2010. “FDI Spillover in an Emerging 
 Market: the Role of Foreign Firms’ Country Origin Diversity and Domestic 
 Firms’ Absorptive Capacity.” Strategic Management Journal 31(9): 969-989. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
Appendix I: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
         CBI        1972    .3386004    .1265002        .09        .69
                                                                      
        oecd        8895    .1225408    .3279277          0          1
      ltrade        6696    3.977761    .5996164   1.599388   6.894315
       trade        6696    64.18218    49.68401       4.95     986.65
        fed9         146    1.226027    1.085792          0   3.555556
        fed6         144    1.417593    1.296939          0          4
                                                                      
      author        2153    .4561078    .4981855          0          1
       state        4680    .7961538    .8201787          0          2
        muni        3634    1.275179    .8296762          0          2
   Democracy        6507    .9127094    7.431338        -10         10
fiscfedspend        1122    23.46114    15.09689         .4       98.8
                                                                      
  fiscfedtax        1251    22.54181    18.24337         .2       93.8
        lfdi        6044     18.6749     3.02298   2.302585    26.5524
         fdi        6613    3.38e+09    1.71e+10  -2.83e+10   3.40e+11
        year        8893     1991.72    12.31511       1970       2012
       ccode        8881    449.1746    263.2077          2        990
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
      229    100.00            XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
                                                                          
       15      6.55  100.00   (other patterns)
        1      0.44   93.45    ....................11111111111111111111111
        1      0.44   93.01    .......................11111111111111111111
        1      0.44   92.58    ..........................11111111111111111
        1      0.44   92.14    .........................................11
        2      0.87   91.70    ....................................1111111
        5      2.18   90.83    .111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
       15      6.55   88.65    ..........................1.1.1.11111111111
       49     21.40   82.10    ..11111111111111111111111111111111111111111
      139     60.70   60.70    1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
                                                                          
     Freq.  Percent    Cum.    Pattern
                         2      14      41        43        43      43      44
Distribution of T_i:   min      5%     25%       50%       75%     95%     max
           (ccode*year uniquely identifies each observation)
           Span(year)  = 43 periods
           Delta(year) = 1 unit
    year:  1970, 1971, ..., 2012                             T =         44
   ccode:  2, 10, ..., 990                                   n =        229
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Appendix II: TSLINE - FDI 
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Appendix III: Regression Results With Central Bank Independence Control 
Omitted 
The Impact of Administrative Federalism on the Inflow of Foreign Direct 
Investment 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model I Model II 
   
Lag FDI -7.62*** -8.01*** 
 (2.17) (2.32) 
Federalism, 6-dimension 0.7702*** 
(0.2087) 
 
Federalism, 9-dimension  
 
0.9271*** 
(0.2413) 
Logged Trade 1.0697**  1.0144** 
 (0.4032) (0.4095) 
Democracy 0.0443 0.0216 
 (0.0496) (0.0550) 
OECD 1.0540* 1.279** 
 (0.5930) (0.6241) 
Year 0.0263** 0.0705 
 (0.6348) (0.0250) 
Constant -116.7515** -126.1677*** 
 (51.40866) (48.991) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The Impact of Fiscal Federalism on the Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model I Model II Model 3 
    
Lag FDI 1.02** 1.04** 2.14** 
 (3.42) (4.13) (1.05) 
Subnational Revenue -0.0057 
(0.0111) 
 0.0288** 
(0.0139) 
Subnational 
Expenditures 
 
 
-0.0032 
(0.0104) 
0.0257* 
(00137) 
Rev*Spend   -0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
Logged Trade -0.8453**  -0.8888** -1.3695*** 
 (0.2775) (0.2909) (0.1883) 
Kauffman Rule of Law 0.455 
(0.275) 
04928* 
(0.2656) 
0.4124** 
(01511) 
Democracy -0.0459** -0.0375** -0.0526*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0174) (0.0164) 
Year 0.1632*** 0.1628*** 0.1234*** 
 (0.0.0177) (0.01867) (0.0201) 
OECD 1.6388** 1.5731** 1.4841*** 
 (0.7548) (0.7238) (0.2744) 
Constant -302.1547** -301.1806*** -221.0722*** 
 (35.0066) (36.8731) (40.036) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The Impact of Political Federalism on the Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III 
    
Lag FDI -3.25** 3.26** 3.24** 
 (1.28) (1.28) (1.28) 
Municipal Elections 0.0000 
(0.0004) 
 0.0857 
(0.2024) 
State Elections  -0.0002 
(0.0004) 
 -0.0003 
(0.0004) 
Additive  -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
Multiplicative   0.0001 
(0.0002) 
Logged Trade 0.8437***  0.8431*** 0.8435**
* 
 (0.2448) (0.2447) (0.2454) 
Kauffman Rule of Law 0.7071*** 
(0.1937) 
0.7071*** 
(0.1926) 
0.7046**
* 
(0.1941) 
Democracy 0.0188 0.0187 0.0176 
 (0.0199) (0.0197) (0.021) 
OECD 1.4854** 1.487** 1.4524** 
 (0.5897) (0.5888) (0.5898) 
Year 0.1178*** 0.1178*** 0.1174**
* 
 (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Constant -219.2919*** -219.2951*** -
218.6012
*** 
 (20.5119) (20.5004) (20.5246) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
